Policy makers in Europe and the United States frequently assert that economic liberalization will lead to domestic political and social reform. But just how is this transformation to take place? During recent debates over the admission of China to the World Trade Organization and the struggle over the extension to China of most favored nation status by the United States, policy makers regularly asserted that the desire to secure investment and attract capital would require China to establish the rule of law and develop a judicial branch capable of enforcing binding legal rules.
Policy makers in Europe and the United States frequently assert that economic liberalization will lead to domestic political and social reform. But just how is this transformation to take place? During recent debates over the admission of China to the World Trade Organization and the struggle over the extension to China of most favored nation status by the United States, policy makers regularly asserted that the desire to secure investment and attract capital would require China to establish the rule of law and develop a judicial branch capable of enforcing binding legal rules.
1 Together, they argued, these actions would trigger a chain reaction transforming economic liberalization into political and social reform.
Is the rule of law a "machine that runs of itself," 2 an automated conveyor belt translating economic incentives into political and social liberalization and bearing the body politic along with it? If this popular claim is correct, it would have implications for a wide range of theories dealing not only with international relations and comparative politics but also for those concerned with public law and judicial behavior. If these assumptions are wrong, it suggests that the policy debate over globalization needs to be cast in more realistic terms, unclouded by faulty assumptions about the mechanistic nature of law and judicial institutions.
This article argues that there may well be a powerful spillover effect from one area of legal doctrine into another-from rulings designed to secure economic liberalization to rulings in the social and political arenas. In other words, there is a foundation for these claims. But despite this foundation, it is also clear that some constitutional polities seem hard pressed to stem this spillover, while others can block it quite easily-and at little or no cost to their own economic well-being. Understanding when and why we might expect to see this spillover effect, and why some can impede it and others cannot should be a topic of interest to students of international politics and public law alike, not to mention policy makers concerned with economic, political, and social liberalization.
"A machine that runs of itself?"
Policy makers argue that trade with China will force it to adopt and adhere to the rule of law or risk the loss of international capital and significant foreign trade.
3 Once China establishes the rule of law and the institutions to enforce it, they assert that the result will be far more than mere trade; that it also will contribute to the liberalization of China's social and political regime. As a rational actor pursuing its economic interests in the global economy, China would be forced to accept the unpleasant (political and social liberalization) to secure the good (economic growth and prosperity). This is an argument that resonates with some leading economists and within a number of important nongovernmental organizations. 4 Broad evolutionary notions about the rule of law are "suddenly everywhere-a venerable part of Western political philosophy [is] enjoying a new run as a rising imperative of the era of globalization promises to move countries past the first, relatively easy phase of political and economic liberalization . . . to a deeper level of reform." 5 And it appears to be built on an intellectual foundation of evolutionary theories "predicting that law develops over time and in interaction with changes in the socioeconomic environment." 6 On the other side of the Atlantic, European Commissioner for Trade Pascal Lamy has insisted that bringing China into the World Trade Organization "should serve to boost the rule of law in China," and that extensive trade with China "will be a push in the right direction in other spheres." 7 He further noted that "the spillover of economic freedom and respect for commercial law into the political and social sphere will be gradual but the contribution made by WTO entry will be positive."
8 Echoing Lamy's enthusiasm for Chinese admission into the WTO, the Economist editorialized that "[t]rade with foreigners will add to the pressure, already developing internally, for the rule of law to be extended."
9 Progress in the field of commercial law, "which is where a more prosperous bourgeoisie first makes its presence felt," the editors continued, "is especially encouraging."
American enthusiasm for this line of thought has survived the transition to the Bush administration. During confirmation hearings, Secretary of Statedesignee Colin Powell testified that a key challenge for American foreign policy would be to engage China as a trading partner and even as a regional rival "by enmeshing them in the rule of law, by exposing them to the powerful forces of a free enterprise system in democracy."
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This enthusiasm is not without foundation. A close examination of the role law has played in both the United States and Europe suggests that this process can function. The question then is this: Though it may function rather well in America and Europe, is there reason to expect the rule-of-law process to function the same way in China?
The American model
There appear to be three important steps in the economic engagement-rule-oflaw process. First, judges will embed claims to judicial authority, making it increasingly difficult for the government to reverse their rulings. Second, judges will identify and employ implied powers (and implied restrictions) inferred from explicit powers and prohibitions. And third, because of the nature of legal reasoning, doctrine developed in one arena will not be easily limited to that arena and thus will overlap with other areas. Therefore, doctrine needed to assure economic goals, particularly economic liberalization, will spill over to govern cases in the political and social realms as well.
The third step is greatly dependent on the existence of embedded judicial authority and an established tradition of broad interpretation of judicial rules and doctrine. Legal reasoning tends to function inductively. Starting from the facts, judges identify appropriate legal rules or doctrines governing similar facts. If the general rule appears to apply to the specifics of the case, the rule is applied. If the general rule does not fully resolve the case at hand, the general rule is modified as a result of the new facts, and the doctrine is extended or trimmed as needed.
In the American model, the first step is well illustrated by the Supreme Court's 1803 ruling in Marbury v. Madison, where the justices cleverly wrapped a broad assertion of authority to exercise judicial review within a decision that otherwise favored the executive branch. 14 The government won the case, but in accepting the ruling it wanted, the administration lent legitimacy and authority to the expansive legal doctrine embedded in the case.
The second step can be seen in McCulloch v. Maryland. 15 In providing the foundation for broad, open-textured readings of constitutional and legal language, Chief Justice John Marshall argued that the nature of a constitution requires that "only its great outlines should be marked, its important objects designated, and the minor ingredients which compose those objects, be deduced from the nature of the objects themselves." 16 With judicial authority embedded and expansive interpretation established and fortified, the stage was set for the third step, the spillover effect. In the American example, we see this play out in the evolution of the Court's application of the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
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Starting with the premise that economic liberty and the rights of property were among the most fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, the justices set a very high bar to any government regulation that might interfere with those rights. 18 Focusing on the word law in the "due process of law" clause, the justices argued that law, by definition, had to be a rational exercise of government power. No amount of process, they insisted, could possibly save an irrational law. And laws that arbitrarily infringed on fundamental rights to property were, by definition, irrational or ultra vires and had to be rejected by the court.
"Life, liberty and property," Justice Joseph Bradley wrote, in one of the first cases to test the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause, are "fundamental rights" that "can be interfered with [only] by lawful regulations." 19 And any regulation that "arbitrarily assailed" the right to property could not be deemed a lawful regulation. 20 Finding substantive, fundamental rights in the procedural requirements of the due process clause came to be known as the doctrine of substantive due process. By the 1920s, the justices were actively using the due process clause to protect property rights, striking down government provisions designed to curtail child labor, establish health and safety rules, wage and hour restrictions, and protections for unionization, among others. 21 The court essentially removed itself from close scrutiny of economic regulation after Franklin Roosevelt's landslide elections in 1932 and 1936 led to a fundamental shift in academic, political, and legal circles. 22 But the justices Globalization and the rule of law 431
did not forsake the doctrine of substantive due process. In later decades, the justices readily employed the rules and doctrines developed in the economic sphere to protect what the justices now argued were fundamental rights to travel, procreate (or not), to live with an extended family, to marry those of another race, to educate one's children in foreign languages, and to guarantee personal privacy, among others.
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It is easy to understand that policy makers, looking back at this history, might conclude that there was some sort of mechanistic logic in this evolution. That the American experience seems replicated in that of the European Union during the past thirty years has only reinforced this impression on both sides of the Atlantic.
Judicial power, economic liberalization, and the spillover effect in Europe
Though the European Community and, later, the European Union was motivated by a desire to eliminate military conflict, the means to accomplish that end have been predominantly economic, including commitments to the free movement of goods, capital, services, and people across their traditional borders. 24 Established by a set of agreements leading to the 1952 European Coal and Steel Community, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) was initially thought of as an arbiter of trade disputes.
Looking at the ECJ's evolution, an American can hardly be blamed for seeing the shadow of John Marshall and the American Supreme Court. As had Chief Justice Marshall, so the ECJ practiced the delicate art of expanding its authority and power-and the reach of its doctrine-without actually forcing direct confrontation with the political branches. (This is the first step in the mechanistic rule-of-law thesis.) Echoing Marbury, the ECJ asserted significant judicial power in cases such as Costa v. Ente Nazionale per L'Energia Elettrica (E.N.E.L.), where the material effect of the ruling itself was limited or where the member state would actually win the case. 25 Having won, however, the state had no incentive to reject or oppose the ruling, and, by accepting the ruling in the case at hand, it implicitly accepted and supported the doctrine and jurisprudence that came with that ruling.
Like John Marshall in McCulloch, so, too, the ECJ-in Van Gend en Loos 26 -announced principles of interpretation based on extrapolations from structural commitments (the second step in the economic engagementrule-of-law process). As the ECJ put it in Van Gend, "[t]o ascertain whether the provisions of an international treaty extend so far in their effects, it is necessary to consider the spirit, the general scheme and the wording of those provisions."
27 European Community law, the judges concluded, "not only imposes obligations on individuals but is also intended to confer upon them rights which become part of their legal heritage." 28 Van Gend helped transform a traditional trade treaty into something approaching a constitution, establishing a sweeping method of interpretation, asserting the superiority of an international treaty to domestic law, and handing individual citizens new rights to claim against their own national governments.
The ECJ, once having asserted, in 1970, that the treaties incorporated broad social rights (even though few of those rights were explicit in the text), took the third step in the economic engagement-rule-of-law process. 29 Continuing to enforce legal rights fundamental to business and trade, ECJ judges were unable or unwilling to disaggregate those same rights-including "the right to a hearing, freedom from search and seizure, confidentiality of information, and protection from excessive penalties"-from their social and political counterparts. 
Europe tries-and fails-to limit the court to the economic sphere
This difficulty of separating the economic from the social and political was even more explicitly experienced in Europe than it had been in the United States. With the European Monetary Union and expansion into Eastern Europe moving up the agenda as the member states began to negotiate the Treaty on the European Union 31 (TEU or the Maastricht Treaty) in 1992, there was a general concern that the ECJ not be allowed to expand its reach to areas beyond the traditional economic sphere.
But how to keep the court out? The obvious answer would be to curtail sharply the ECJ's jurisdiction. But most member states were unwilling to abandon an institution that had been so useful in moving them toward the politically costly goal of genuine economic integration. The problem was this: Could they maintain the court's role in the economic realm, and yet keep it out of social, political, and cultural affairs? The answer they arrived at came to be known as the "three pillars" or "Greek temple" approach. 32 The Maastricht Treaty required the ECJ to limit itself to enforcing only the original economic treaty provisions (and subsequent amendments) dealing with the economic "pillar" of the union and to avoid the more sensitive "pillars" of foreign affairs and home/judicial affairs. 33 This effort failed. Court cases throughout the 1990s illustrate the court's inability (or unwillingness) to confine its doctrine to the economic sphere. Though some saw this as the result of a conscious effort on the part of a determined, activist judiciary, 34 others pointed to the neutral development of doctrine and the logical progression of the legal enterprise. 35 A quick look at five very different cases from this period makes plain the difficulty.
• In an Irish case, the ECJ ruled that distributing information about British abortion clinics (where abortion was legal) in Ireland (where it was not) was a first-pillar case about the provision of commercial services. But it was impossible to argue that this was not also a case with doctrinal implications for the third-pillar arenas of free speech and abortion restrictions.
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• Language rights are at the heart of Belgian politics and internal security. And yet the court ruled that a Belgian law requiring the labeling of all products in both French and Flemish violated European rules designed to eliminate requirements that would have the effect of protecting local industries against competition. In this case, the Belgian requirement would have favored local bottlers over those selling throughout Europe for whom the additional labeling requirement would add costs or cause them to abandon the small Belgian market.
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• Could Greece close its ports to all ships from the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia? Greece asserted that its national security decision had "no link with commercial policy" and therefore did not fall "within the scope" of the binding treaties. 38 But the ECJ ruled that article 186 of the Treaty of Rome "empowers the Court to prescribe any necessary interim measures in cases before it," noting emphatically that the treaty "makes no exceptions or distinctions according to the nature of the case."
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• Austria banned circulation-boosting puzzle contests with cash prizes, arguing that they allow wealthy German press conglomerates to drive smaller Austrian competitors out of the market for German-language publications. Was this a first-pillar protectionist measure, as the Germans asserted? Or was it a legitimate third-pillar protection for a free press in Austria? The ECJ ruled against Austria, extending a doctrine established in Gebhard v. Milan Bar Association 40 that limits and defines the parameters of the third-pillar as well as the first.
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• Striking at the very soul of European identity, a professional football player asked the ECJ to strike down rules that blocked him from selling his services to the highest bidder. The rules were designed to prevent wealthy teams in Italy and Germany from signing all the best players, and the member states (and the European Commission itself) asserted that these rules were essential to the maintenance of a critical European cultural and social institution. I-3689. 42 Germany, France, and Italy joined the European Commission itself in insisting that the ECJ refuse the case because "in most cases a sport such as football is not an economic activity,"
Unable to disaggregate the first-pillar employment issue from third-pillar cultural concerns, the ECJ found for the employee. And, because football rules are set by international federations and not by the employers themselves, the ruling also had an impact on the second pillar. The case suggested that international federations, NGOs, and others that set broad rules for nonstate actors might now be subject to European employment laws and the principles of the free movement of capital, labor, goods, and services.
These are but a few of the cases where ECJ doctrine developed in the economic sphere spilled over into national security and justice and home affairs. It is hardly surprising, then, that European policy makers would agree with American politicians that the judicial institutions and doctrines needed to participate in a global economy and world trade might be expected to force reluctant nations to accept social and political reform as the price of full participation in the glories of globalization.
The U.S. and European examples may suggest one model, but it is not the only model available to China and other regimes contemplating the costs and benefits of integrating into the global economy. Though a commitment to the rule of law and the establishment of the judicial institutions needed to enforce that rule may lead to an effort to expand judicial authority through a broad interpretation of underlying legal or constitutional principles, the migration of judicial doctrine can be stopped effectively, efficiently, and constitutionallyand all with no costs to be paid in terms of economic sanctions or penalties. And just as advocates for the economic engagement-rule-of-law process would project, Singapore appears to be enforcing the rule of law. Singapore ranked six notches above the United States when the IMD's 1997 respondents were asked if they had full "confidence in the fair administration of justice in the society." 44 And government leaders have long made clear their commitment to the rule of law and its role in economic prosperity. Lee Kuan Yew, who served as Singapore's prime minister for thirty years, told Parliament in 1995 that adjudication on the "merits and in accordance with the law" is critical, particularly when the government is a party to the case. 45 "To have it otherwise," he said, "would risk the loss of our status as an investment and financial center." 46 Singapore's "reputation for the rule of law," Lee continued, "has been and is a valuable economic asset, part of our capital, although an intangible one." 47 Singapore has a written Constitution with a well-paid, well-educated judiciary to interpret and enforce it. The Constitution explicitly guarantees individual rights, including due process protections against deprivation of life or liberty "save in accordance with law." 48 And not only does Singapore's Constitution explicitly incorporate British common law but, until 1994, the Judicial Committee of Her Britannic Majesty's Privy Council served as the final court of appeal for Singapore. 49 If the economic engagement-rule-of-law model applied, then we might expect that Singapore's judges would have established judicial power in a nonthreatening context (step one), begun to develop broad readings of key constitutional provisions (step two), and then extended legal doctrine, developed in the economic sphere, to the political and social arena (step three).
Singapore, economic incentives, and the rule of law
It turns out the Singapore judiciary, in fact, did take the first two steps in the process, following the pattern established in Marbury and McCulloch and confirmed by Costa v. E.N.E.L. and Van Gend. Singapore's judges did start the conveyor belt rolling. But the government, following the provisions of Singapore's Constitution to the letter, was able to turn the machine off before the third step could be taken. More significantly for advocates of the economic engagement-rule-of-law thesis, Singapore did this at no cost to the country's status in the global investment community. In 1980, Ong Ah Chuan was charged with possession of more than fifteen grams of heroin, which, under Singapore law, establishes a rebuttable presumption that the accused is engaged in drug trafficking and therefore (if convicted) subject to a mandatory death sentence. 50 The Privy Council (then still the court of final resort for Singapore) insisted that the word "law" in part IV, article 9(1) of the Singapore Constitution incorporated "those fundamental rules of natural justice that had formed part and parcel of the common law of England that was in operation in Singapore at the commencement of the Constitution." 51 It would have been taken for granted by the makers of the Constitution that the "law" to which citizens could have recourse for the protection of fundamental liberties assured to them by the Constitution would be a system of law that did not flout those fundamental rules. If it were otherwise it would be misuse of language to speak of law as something which affords "protection" for the individual in the enjoyment of his fundamental liberties. The Ong Ah Chuan precedent came back to haunt the government eight years later when Singapore's own judges ordered the release from prison of four dissidents who had been arrested and detained without trial under Singapore's Internal Security Act (ISA)-a leftover from British colonial days-for their alleged role in what the government charged were Marxist plots to destabilize the nation. Arguing that the government had failed to follow the ISA's own procedural requirements, Chng Suan Tze and three others asked the court to order their release.
The Singapore High Court of Appeal shocked the island nation when it agreed that the government had failed to demonstrate that the rules had been properly followed. "All power has legal limits and the rule of law demands that the courts should be able to examine the exercise of discretionary power," the judges ruled, concluding that "the notion of a subjective or unfettered [government] discretion is contrary to the rule of law." 54 Taking what might appear to be the second step in the economic engagement-rule-of-law process, the judges built on their own doctrine and on Privy Council rulings (including Ong Ah Chuan). Invoking article 9(1), the judges insisted that any government action that is arbitrary or irrational must be considered ultra vires-an act beyond law and therefore, by definition, a violation of Singapore's written Constitution. 55 One can hear the echo of U.S. Supreme Court Justice Joseph Bradley for whom the arbitrary infringement of "fundamental" rights could hardly be considered to be "lawful." 56 The presumption of innocence, the Singapore judges had ruled in Ong Ah Chuan, "is a fundamental human right protected by the [Singapore] Constitution and cannot be limited or diminished by any Act of Parliament" other than formal constitutional amendment. 57 The judges explained that though it is "nowhere expressly referred to in the Constitution," the presumption of innocence is "imported into" Singapore's Constitution through that document's due process and equal protection clauses. 58 The court in Chng Suan Tze noted that they accepted the precedent set by Ong Ah Chuan that to accept discretion by the government under the Internal Security Act "would mean giving the executive arbitrary powers of detention, thereby rendering such powers unconstitutional and void." 59 The court ordered that the detained individuals be released. And they were. They were placed in cars at the Whitley Road detention center and driven down the street to the end of the block. The car doors opened, the prisoners got out. They were then arrested again, placed in a different set of cars, and promptly returned to the detention center. 60 This time, however, the government followed the court's instructions and made sure to secure the formal authorization they had failed to secure the first time.
At this point, the government stepped in to make sure that step two would never lead to step three. Six weeks after the court handed down its decision in Chng Suan Tze, the government proposed constitutional amendments revoking the court's authority to exercise judicial review in similar cases in the future. Carefully and precisely following their constitutional rules, the amendments became law nine days after they were introduced in parliament, rolling the judicial doctrine in internal security cases back to the standard established in a 1971 case, 61 predating both Chng Suan Tze and Ong Ah Chuan. These amendments also abolished virtually all avenues of appeal for those arrested under the Internal Security Act, and the amendments additionally terminated all appeals of security cases to the Privy Council. The conveyor belt was not just turned off-it was thrown away.
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But was there an economic price to be paid for this wrench in the globalization machine? Not at all. No corporations fled the country. Singapore's competitiveness rankings held strong, capital continued to flow in, and surveys continued to rank Singapore's legal system as one of the best in the world.
In light of the Singapore experience, are policy makers right to assume that the powerful spillover effects of the economic engagement-rule-of-law process will work in China? Will China follow the American and European pattern, or is there reason to believe that China will follow something closer to the Singapore model? China's approach to the assertion of judicial authority in Hong Kong may provide an early indication.
Applying the Singapore model: China and Hong Kong
Despite the fact that Hong Kong has never existed as an independent nation, it has long been ranked, with Singapore and the United States, as one of the world's most competitive economies, holding down third place in the IMD's rankings for 1996, 1997, and even for 1998, a year after Britain handed over political, legal, and economic control to China. Hong Kong's standing fell to fourteenth in the 2000 survey but bounced back to number six in the 2001 survey.
63 It continues to outpace such old-line competitors as Japan (twenty-sixth in 2001), France (twenty-fifth), Germany (twelfth), and even the United Kingdom (nineteenth).
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Hong Kong is governed by a comprehensive, written Basic Law, which was negotiated by Britain and China as part of the 1997 handover agreement. The Basic Law functions as the equivalent of a constitution and was designed to maintain international confidence in Hong Kong's economy in the face of fears of capital flight following the handover. Among the most important provisions are guarantees for the continuation of the rule of law. Hong Kong's legal system was left intact, as were its doctrinal foundations. What was left ambiguous, however, was what would happen if Hong Kong's judges were asked to rule on the legitimacy of actions taken by the new Hong Kong executive. Economic engagement-rule-of-law theories would suggest that the political leadership would accommodate an active court, fearing that overt interference with the judiciary would undermine world confidence in the stability of the legal and political system, which, in turn, would rattle investors and international capital markets. Thus would China's seat at the global banquet be threatened. That is the theory. It was not, however, the practice.
In January 1999, the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal (CFA) built on established Hong Kong and British doctrine to move to the second step in the economic engagement-rule-of-law process. The court decided that Beijing's policy concerning which mainland Chinese citizens would be allowed to live in Hong Kong (the right of abode) violated fundamental rights protected by the Basic Law. 66 Ruling that the Basic Law was both national law for China and the Constitution for the Special Administrative Region of Hong Kong, a unanimous CFA insisted that "laws which are inconsistent with the Basic Law are of no effect and are invalid," just as would be the case "with other Constitutions." 67 It is "for the courts of the Region to determine whether an act of the National People's Congress or its Standing Committee is inconsistent with the Basic Law, subject of course to the provisions of the Basic Law itself."
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Trying to avoid a direct confrontation, Chinese authorities made it clear through journals and academic publications that the court should reconsider and revise its decision, not just on the right of abode but, more significantly, on the question of supremacy and which institution would have the final say in the interpretation of the Basic Law. After a month of intense (and extraordinarily public) political pressure, the judges took the unprecedented step of issuing a clarification. Noting first that political criticism had "turned into vicious attacks against the court and personally against" the chief justice, the court then tersely stated that its January 1999 ruling "did not question" the authority of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (NPC) in Beijing to make the final interpretations of law.
69 "The court," it said, "accepts that it cannot question that authority." 70 The court did not, however, overturn its ruling, reinforcing the first step in the process-announcing key judicial doctrine in a pronouncement that, nevertheless, gave the government what it sought. This led the NPC to pass formal legislation in June 1999 that redefined the right of abode, overruling the court's January decision and making clear that in future the NPC in Beijing-and not the Hong Kong court-would have the final say on the interpretation of the Basic Law. Did China's bold removal of the conveyor belt undermine Hong Kong's economic status in the global economy? Not at all. There was no mass exodus of capital, no relocation of corporate transactions. "Similar to Singapore," one scholar wrote, "there is likely to be a dichotomy in [Hong Kong's] approach towards commercial law and the law relating to personal liberty and civil society."
71 As officials were quick to note, this was a fight over the locus of constitutional interpretation and had no direct effect on contracts, torts, the rights of private property, or corporate law. In these areas, Chinese officials made clear, British common law and British commercial law could and would continue to hold sway.
Constitutional space
Despite the fact that the judges in Singapore and Hong Kong followed the logic of precedents and norms as they understood them, their governments were able to block the third stage in the process (the transition from economic rulings to social and political liberalization) and at no discernible cost to their economic standing in the world community. Why were they able to do this, while their European counterparts were not? The answer lies, in part, in something we might call constitutional space.
Constitutional space is a concept that tries to describe the range of judicial activity that is possible within a constitutional system. It is the product of both legal supply and political demand-and the economic engagement-rule-oflaw process requires both. Judges must have an appropriate supply of formal and institutional rules, including a significant degree of insulation from constitutional revision. But the demand side is equally important. For the process to work, political actors must acquiesce in-or even encourage-extensions of court doctrine, relying on judicial rulings to accomplish objectives they seek but feel politically incapable of advocating independently.
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On the supply side, judges must have room to maneuver. The costs of constitutional amendment are tremendous in both Europe and the United States. In America, not only is a supermajority needed in the partisan and often closely divided legislature but amendment requires an arduous process of state ratification. In Europe, treaty revision (the equivalent of constitutional amendment) requires an even more difficult process of negotiation and multilateral ratification by still-sovereign nations.
Singapore, by contrast, requires just a two-thirds vote in Parliament (where in 1989 the governing People's Action Party held eighty seats in what was then an eighty-one-member Parliament). Though Singapore maintains regular elections, with some token opposition candidates, it has effectively been a one-party state for nearly its entire history. With no discernible internal political demand for an expanding judicial role and with a very simple and quick route to constitutional amendment, it is safe to say that Singapore's judges have very little constitutional space in which to function. It is relatively easy, therefore, to slow or even block the spillover effect. By contrast, blocking spillover in America or the European Union is extraordinarily difficult, as the Europeans learned after Maastricht.
Turning to the demand side, we can see that the extension of judicial authority is not purely a judge-driven phenomenon. The U.S. Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides a good illustration in the American case. 73 Racial segregation was primarily a function of state law. The most constitutionally coherent way for the national government to eliminate these barriers would have been to pass legislation to enforce a clause in the Fourteenth Amendment that prohibits the states from abridging the "privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States." 74 But this route seemed foreclosed by Supreme Court rulings handed down shortly after the end of the American Civil War. 75 This meant legislators had two choices-insist that the Court overturn its earlier cases or persuade the Court to expand its doctrine in another area to authorize these laws. The alternative was obvious-an extension of the Court's increasingly broad construction of the Commerce Clause. 76 Congress asked the Court to rule that the national authority needed to outlaw racial discrimination in public accommodations was justified because discrimination interfered with interstate and international trade and commerce. 77 In this case, the spillover effect was demand-driven-the justices agreed that Congress indeed could build civil rights on the foundation of the Commerce Clause, not that Congress had to do so. 78 Globalization and the rule of law 443
A similar story can be told in Europe. John Major's failure to incite a general revolt against the ECJ, in the negotiations leading to the Maastricht Treaty, was a clear reminder that politicians saw the court as an important component in their effort to solve Europe's problems in achieving collective action. The existence of the court allowed member state politicians to reap the political benefits of European integration without having to shoulder their constituents' blame for having surrendered power. Counterintuitively, there was also demand from judges within the individual member states. Though these judges might appear to have the most to lose from the growing power of the ECJ, European court rulings actually could increase the power of many member state judges who could use EU law at home to shape, constrain, and even overturn domestic law at odds with European Court decisions. 79 Moreover, the ECJ provided an extraordinary opportunity for judges in lower courts in the member states to override their own domestic supreme courts by "using an appeal to the ECJ to challenge established jurisprudence and to circumvent higher court jurisprudence." 80 Demand, in short, came not only from member state politicians, but from their courts as well.
Though Singapore's politicians have turned to the courts for expansive rulings, those appeals largely have been limited to bringing defamation lawsuits against political opponents. 81 There has been no discernible effort to use the courts to accomplish broad (and politically costly) public policy objectives. Lacking both supply and demand, Singapore's judges have virtually no constitutional space in which to function.
Policy implications
Globalization requires the rule of law. The rule of law requires a reliable and at least somewhat independent judiciary to enforce established rules. And the logic of legal doctrine certainly encourages courts to extend economic rulings to their logical conclusion in the political and social arenas, a finding well worth extensive academic investigation not only in Europe and the United States but in careful, cross-national studies. Courts with adequate constitutional space in which to function are far more likely to move in these directions, and that same constitutional space is likely to make it hard for political leaders to avoid these spillover effects. But even adequate constitutional space will not guarantee that the globalization machine can "run of itself."
Law is very much a part and product of the political and institutional environment in which it functions. Scholars have advanced our knowledge of judicial behavior as they have our understanding of the behavior of political actors and the important role of economic incentives. What is needed, however, is greater attention to the interaction among these actors, institutions, and incentives, and to the ways in which judges, constitutions, and legal doctrine influence and constrain political choices, and how political choices constrain and shape judicial doctrine. 82 The message such scrutiny would reveal needs to be understood by politicians and key decision makers who must finally accept the notion that machines do not run themselves.
This essay is not an argument against trade with China. It is an effort to challenge a dominant assumption that continues to drive important policy decisions. There is a foundation for this assumption, which may be significant for students of public law and constitutionalism as well as for those interested in the legalization of international relations. 83 But if there is a mechanical, necessary link between economic engagement and social and political reform (and there may be) that link is not to be found in the simple establishment of the rule of law and its application by judicial actors. 
